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THE TAMING OF THE SHREW: MAY THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
AND FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY EAT AND DRINK AS
FRIENDS?
Honorable Marianne D. Short & Charles H. Brower, II
I. INTRODUCTION
Vilified as the resurrection of federal common law,' an erosion of the sep-
aration of powers,2 an ad hoc judicial fray into the sphere of foreign policy,3
and an abdication of the Judiciary's obligation to develop international law,4
the modern act of state doctrine has acquired the status of a doctrinal bogey-
man. The doctrine's amorphous theoretical underpinnings result in inconsis-
tent applications, causing the "airy castle" to materialize in unexpected ways.5
Most controversial has been the discussion, initiated in Alfred Dunhill of Lon-
don, Incorporated v. Republic of Cuba6 and unresolved to date,7 of whether
the restrictive views of foreign sovereign immunity requires a commercial
exception to the act of state doctrine.
Following the Supreme Court's recent admonition to reflect upon the act
of state doctrine's nature before discussing its possible exceptions,9 we examine
the core principles of territoriality embodied in both the act of state doctrine
and the commercial exception to foreign sovereign immunity. We conclude that
distinct territorial concerns render the act of state doctrine wholly consistent
with the commercial activities exception to foreign sovereign immunity and
1. Sa Lous lienkin, To reign A&kr Poecwf ofthefaieral Corts, 64 Cotm. L RaY. 805,806,81417 (104) (noting
the modern act of state doctrine Is a creature of federal common law and critidzing the possre," Supreme Court for not conductn a
omre serious inquiry Into the authority for Judicial promulgatIon of federal law that Is neither compelled by the Constitution nor
derived from a statutory regime)
2. Soee ac Natonal de Cuba v. Sabbaino, 376 U.S, 398. 461-62 (1964) (WhPte J, dissenting) (cuitcing the majrity
for abandoning the Judiciarys shared coptnefor matters affecting foreign relatons ichael Dazyle Abolishing theAdt f Stte
Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L RY. 325, 328, 375 (1986) (making a similar gment) Hlkin, r awe 1, at822 (de ing the Saba.
tlno majority's staggle to avoid a foation that woud result In the oss of ludicisi independence)
3. Se Sabbatino, 376 U.s at 462-63 (White, J., dissenting) (criticizing the mJorfly for filling to give adequate contskler
ation to the Executive's policy regarding the legality of Cuban expropftlo); Henkin, spn, note 1, at 22. 826 (recogulzing thai the
Sabbaftno Coats holding refuires courts hidependently to review the needs of U.S foreign policy and doubtng that the bench poe.
sem the istitutionl competence necessy for the task) Jonathan, P W lt, Note, An Rulhrtton of te Commrcial Actfriv
Ecetion to $acAd ofSMt Doctrine, I U. DAr=.v L RRv. 1265 (1994) (nolIng that, under Sabbofno, courts must make independent
predictios about the efect of oliation on foreign dfesa, even If the Executive believes the proceedings will have no adverse effect
on United States interests).
4. See Sabatino, 376 US. at 450-56 (White, J, dissentlng) (expressing dismay at the Cort's decision to place the aces
tanment of international law beyond the competence of federal courts) Ifeanyl Achebe, Th Act ofStite Doctrine and tW Foreign
Sowign Immunities Act of 1976- Can My eCailst', 13 MD. J. IWL L & Tlns, 247, 255 (1988) (noft the act of state doctrine s
thought to Impair the development of International law) Baler, supro note 2, at 329, 381 (arguIng the act of ate doctrine arested
the development of inteational law in United States courts) James It Lsn, Yhe Duty of FPodat Courts to Apply International
Law, 1982 B.Y. L ay. 61, 7377 (argulng the act of state doctrine underminea the bench's obligation to apply and develop lnters.
tional law
5. SO Calkjo v. Bancomer, &L, 764 F.2d 1101 ,1113 (Sth Cir 1985) (calling the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Ad at"ta.
gled web of statutory ambiguitie, but noting Its applcation Is simpler than the ac of state doctrine, which is an "airy case')
Busyler sopsr note 2, at 330 (noting the federal courif inability to enunciate a coherent formulation of the doctrne, which has pro.
duced confusing and contradictory applications) WI. Knight, International Debt and t0 Act of Stle Doctri.Judictial Abstention
econidered, 13 N.. J. IrNL & Cot. REo. 35,52 (1988) (noting the lower courts' complete confusion over the act of state doctrie)
Antonla Dola Note, Act of State and Sovereign Immunities Docrin o. The Need to Bstabi Conruity, 17 U.&F. L ia. 91, 100
(1982) (notng the ac of state doctrine lacks dear stndards and, thereDre, ts applied inconulstendy). I David V. Zimmerman, Coaw
ment, ApplyingAn Amorpho s Doctrie Wisl, IS T. l r LJ. 547, 571 (1983) (recognlzing the at of state doctie's aWnp1ios
nm makes It an object of distr.stj
6. 425 U.S. 682,695-706 (1976) (White, J., plurality opinion) (argaing the restrictive view of sovereign immunity rec ires
a commedal e-epton to the act of state doctrine).
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make a separate commercial exception to the act of state doctrine unnecessary.
Part II of this Article briefly traces the evolution of the act of state doc-
trine and foreign sovereign immunity. Part III summarizes the current split of
authority regarding the need for a commercial exception to the act of state doc-
trine and evaluates the strength of the opposing arguments. Finally, Part IV
suggests the failure of either side to appreciate the central role of territoriality
in both doctrines has unnecessarily fuelled the debate, explains how recent
case law has established the doctrines' compatible territorial limitations, and
concludes that this element-rather than business activity-supplies the proper
theoretical basis on which to secure harmony between the act of state doctrine
and the restrictive view of foreign sovereign immunity.
II. CONDUCT VS. STATUS
Since the earliest days of the Republic, United States courts have crafted
rules to facilitate the expansion of intercourse between nations.10 To this end,
they used comity and the act of state doctrine to develop standards for recogni-
tion of foreign sovereign acts." Similarly, foreign sovereign immunity evolved
as a means of according respect to the status of foreign governments."
7. See, e.g., GAI B, Bo & DAvID WaEsTN, InturoIu L CmL IsTAoN I Unu STAID Couzit 713 (2d ed. 992) (noting
the DunhiU plurallty commercial exception to the act of state doctrine has received a mixed reaction In the lower federal courts and
citing conflicting precedent); B ae s sWpra note 2, at 370-71 (stating the federal courts have split, sometimes Internally, regarding
the existence of a commeial exception to the act of state doctrine); Stephen J. Leacock, Me Commercial Activity Exception to the
Act of State Doctrine Revisited. Lvotsion ofa Concet, 13 N.C. J. IWL~ L & Co. REG. 1, 16 (1988) (recognizing the unsettled status
of the proposed commercial exception to the act of state doctrine); Wight,s pWr note 3, at 1286.87 .199 (recognizing the existence of
controversy regarding the proposed commercial exception to the act of elate doctrine and citing conflicting precedent); Zimmerman,
spo note 5, W 558 (noting the lower federal courts have mIrrored the Supreme Court's difference of opinion concerning the exist-
ence of a commercial exception to the act of state doctrine)l Compare John R Ilannon, II, Comment, Foslgn Sovereign Immunity and
the Act ofState. The Need for a Commercial Nxception to the Commercial Exception, 17 U.S.. L Ray. 763, 771 (1983) (arguing the
lower federal courts have tended not to embrace the proposed commercia exception) and Jeffrey J. Clasr, Recent Case, 14 SuIJom
TIANSMAY'L LJ. 183, 189 n.23 (1990) (stating the lower courts have not fully accepted a commercial exception to the act of state doc-
tine) with George Kahale, Chancterizing Nationalizatlos for Purposs of the F Sov Immunities Act and the Act of
State Doctrine, 6 FOittDHM INL JLl 391, 395 & n.24 (1983) (noting that some federal courts have adopted a commercial exception to
the act of state doctrine) and Caldin McCormkk, rho Commercial Eception to oin Sov*ron Immunity and the Act of State
Doctrine, 16 LAv & POLY It'L Bu& 477, 511 (1984) (discoverin support for the oommercial excption in the lower courts).
8. In discussing the restrictive view of foreign sovereign Immunity, this article refes only to the counerclal activity excep.
tion to foreign sovereig Immunity, and not to other exceptions promulgated by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,
because state responsibility for commercial activities constitute die restrictive vieves core princple. Compare 28 U.S.C. Ss 1605(a),
1607(1994) (listing several different exceptions to Imnunity under the Fi1A) with 28 U.SC. 1 1602 (1994) (describing the restrictive
view of foreign sovereign immunity, stating that International law does not provide Immunity for a stae's commercial acts, and requlr-
Ing United States courts to adhere to this approach) and ur~iction of US Courts in Suits Against Foreign Stites: Hearings Befr
the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations ofthe House Comm. on theJndiciar, 94th Cong, 2d Ses. 30
(testimony of Bruno A. RItitsu, describing the restrictive view of sovereign immunity In these terms), 67 (testimony of Michae IL Car,
dozo, same), 8041 (testimony of Cecil j Olmstead, same) (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Hearings.
9. See W.S. Kiukpatick & Co. v. Environmenasl Tectonics Corp., ntl, 493 U.S. 400,404.06 (1990) (Scula, J.) (declining on
behalf of a unanimous Court to address the partef extensive arguments reganlIng possible exceptions to the act of state doctrine
because the transaction fell outside is scope, which embodies a narrower set of principles than the 'vague doctrine" applied by lower
courts); Lynn L Parseghian, Comment, Defining the "Public Act Requirement in the Act of SMate Doctrine, 58 U. Ca. L Rev. 1168,
1168 (1991) (noting the drawbacks of discussing the act of state doctrine's exceptions before understanding Its scope).
10. Se, Ag, PAUL B.SnMS ill or AL, INTuRNTIOAL esiam s S tNMD EcOOMICS 125 (1993) (describing the role of Unted Slates
courts In shaping the rules that govern International commerce, Including the Supreme Court's early recognitlon of foreign sovereign
immunity as a means of facllltating the rise of a legal framework regulating the Interaction of nations).
11. See, eg., Kirhpatrick, 493 U.S. at 406 (describIng the act of state doctrinea a prohibition against Judicial Inquiry Into
the validity of certain acts committed by foreign sovereigns); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895) (describing comity as 'the rec.
ognition which one nation allows in Its territory to the legislatlve, executive or Judicial cts of another'); Republic of Philippines v
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 75 (3d Cir 1994) (quoting Hilton, 159 U.S at 164).
12. See Alfred Dunhit of London, 425 U.S at 705 n.18 (1976) (the plurality and dissenting Justices apparently agreeing
that foreign sovereign Immunity preserves respect for the status of foreign governments); The Schooner Exchange v. 'iFaddon, I I U.S.(7 Cranch) 116, 136-38 (1812) (grounding foreign sovereign Immunity In the need to protect sovereign dignity); Leacock, suprs note
7, at 13 (recognizing that foreign sovereign Immunity Is based upon respect for the dlgsnity of nations).
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A. Foreign Sovereign Acts
Comity protects decisions of a foreign sovereign that cannot be completed
within the sovereign's realm.13 In such cases, a foreign sovereign will request
the assistance of United States courts, which is forthcoming absent some
infringement upon United States public policy.14 However, comity Is not a uni-
form concept and remains a matter within the competence of state law.'5
A different standard applies to conduct that a foreign sovereign has
brought to complete fruition within its own territory.I6 In this situation, United
States courts generally will not question the validity of the sovereign's com-
pleted domestic acts, but will apply them as a rule of decision.' 7 This "act of
state" doctrine protects the integrity of a foreign sovereign's purely domestic
conduct by immunizing it against a U.S. court's public policy analysis.18 In
13. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163-65, 198 (noting that a sovereins judicial legislative and executive declaios carry no auto.
matic extraterritorial effect and rcognizing that one soveretin Is not required to enforce the decisions of foreign governments)
Bandes v. Hlow & Jones, lnc., 826 F. Supp. 700, 708 (SD.N.Y. 1993) (noting the decisions of foreign tribunals will generally be
enforced as a matter of comity); Hessel . YnteM The Bqfb mnt porvinJdgment In Anglo.Amertcan Law, 33 Mica. L Rev.
1129, 1140 (1935) (noting that foreign eecutory judgments are given only prima fade effect), Allied Bak Intl V. Banco Credito Ag
cola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 522 (2d Cir 1985) (finding the tas of Costa Ricas debt to be In the United States and, therefore,
applying a comity analysis Instead of the act of state doctrine) cat disn d, 473 U.S. 934 (1985); United Dank Ud. v. Cosmic Intl,
Inc, 542 F.2d 868, 872.73 (2d Or. 1976) (applying a comity analysis to a foreign soverelgn's decreed seiure of overseas assets
becase the act of state doctrine could not apply to conduct not completed In the foreign soverelgf's territory), Republic of Iraq v. First
Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 50-51 (2d Cir. 1965), ce't denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966) Boland v. Dank Sepahliran, 614 F. Supp. 1166,
1173-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (refuting to apply the act of state doctrine to the foreign sovereign's decision to terminate and libel an
employee In the United States and noting that only comity applies to decisions which cannot be completed within the foreign saver,
etgn's domain); Drexel Burnham Lambert Oroup, Inc. v. Galadari 610 F. Sapp. 114,118 (S.D.N.Y 1985) (refusing to give effect to a for.
elga decree as an act of state because the act of state doctrine looks to the titus of completed conduct rather than the titus of an
official decision, which Is entitled only to comity), ajf'd in relenipart, 777 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985).
14. Sm Hilton, 159 U.S at 165 (noting that courts will not enforce fordgn judgments that violate the forum's public pol-
icy); Bander, 826 F. Supp. at 708; Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 522 (holding that tf a purported act of state does not come to fruition
within the foreig sovereign's borders, United States courts will give It effect only If It Is consistent with the law and policy of the
United States); Bolend, 614 P. Supp. at 1173-74 (same), Roger M. Zaitzeff & Thomas C. guns, Te ACt of Stat Doctrine and te Allied
Bank Case, 40 Bus. LAv. 449,452 (1985) (same), Cark, sra note 7, at 184-85 (same).
15. See, eg., Boes & Wlsmm, sra note 7, at 770 (cting a wealth of authority for this point).
16. Comparw Hiltn, 159 U.S. at 167 (noting that a judgment in rpm againt property within a foreig court's custody is
conclusive and not subject to reexaminatin by another court) and Mapun v. New England Marine Ins. Co, 16F. Cau 483, 48647
(C.C.D. Mass. 1840) (No. 8,961) and Peters v. Warren Ire. Co, 19 F Cas 373, 374-75 (C.C.D. Mass. 1838) (No. 11,035) and The
Alberto, 19 F. CAS. 631, 633 (D. Cal. 1857) (No. 11,142) and The Mary Anne 16 . Co. 953, 954-55 (1). Maine 1826) (No. 9,195) and
Yntema, srpra note 13, at 1140 (noting that executed foreign judgments traditionally were givm full prechesve effect) tids Sabba-
fino, 376 U.S. at 428 (statIng, narrowly, that a United States court will not question the validity of a foreign sovereigs taking of prop
erty within Its own borders) and Rtcad v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S 304, 309 (1918) (tating more broadly that the completed
domestic conduct of a foreign sovereign Is not subject to reexaminuton or modification by United States courts) and Oetjen v. Central
Leaher Co., 246 US. 297, 303"04 (1918) and Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank 114 F.2d 438, 444 (2d Cir. 1940) (noting that
principles of finality prevent American Judicial reexamination of a foreign sovereign's domestic seizres) and Undeshill v. Hemandez,
65 F. 577, 579-80 (2d Ctr. 1895), oftd, 168 U.S. 250 (1897) and Edward J. Morn, Act oflfindness, State oflokght, 13 B.U. IN"L .J.
1 (1995) (noting the act of state doctrines essence Is to distinguish acts of state from mere rtatemeors of acts") (emphasis added)
end Clark, srV note 7, at 183 (explaining the act of state doctrine prevents American judicial Inquiries Into a foreign state's wholly
domestic conduct). See also Brake v. Bancomer, S.N.C, 762 .2d 222, 224 (2d CIr. 1985) (quoting lbScalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v.
Standard Cigar Co, 392 F.2d 706, 715.16 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 393 U.& 924 (1968) (requiring an act of state to have come to com-
plete fruition in the foreign sovereign's terrltory), Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 521; Boland, 614 F. Supp. at 1173; Galadari, 610 F. Supp.
at I18.
17. See Kidpatrick, 493 U.& at 405.07 (noting the act of state doctrine Is a rule of decision tta prevents United States
courts from Invalidating a foreign sovereign's completed domestic acts) Sabbatino, 376 US. at 418, 427-28 (explaining that a United
States court will not question the validity of a foreign sovereign's domestically completed expropriation and noting that this requires
application of the foreign sovereign's act as a rule of decision); Ricaud, 246 U.S. at 309-10 (holding that the completed domestic con
duct of a foreign sovereign Is not subject to re-examtneion or modification by United States courts, which must accept that action as a
rule of decision); Galadari, 610 F. Supp. at 117 (noting the act of state doctrine requires the application of foreign law).
18. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 438 (explaining the act of state doctrine prevents the application of the forum's public policy
regarding expropration), Caffejo, 764. F.2d at 1114 (desctiblng the act of state doctrine as a super choke-of-law rule that prevents the
use of public policy to override the application of foreign law), Alfied Bank, 757 P.2d at 520 (quoting RDwAmtmT (SecoN) or Foms
RaLATnos Uv S 428 cml. c (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1983) for the proposition that the act of state doctrine Is a rule of decision that pre
vents courts from applyinglocal public policy) Gaadart 610 F. Supp. at 117 (discusing how the act of state doctrine prohibits courts
from engaging In a normal comity analysis); Michael Grison, T7a Act ofState Doctrine in Contract Cass as a CorifictofLawr Rate,
1988 U. ILL L Rav. 519, 519 n.3 (quoting Louis Henkn, Act of Stale Today. Recollecttons in Iranquti/ty, 6 Colum. J. TluamStft L 175,
178.80 (1967), for the proposition that the act of state doctn's chief function Is to prevent the forum's courts from applying local
public policy); Henkin, supra note 1, at 825 (making a simila argument).
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doing so, the doctrine embodies the practical recognition that (1) foreign sov-
ereigns have a reasonable expectation of dominion over wholly domestic
affairs, and (2) the application of U.S. public policy norms to such activity
would have little effect beyond complicating the Executive's management of
foreign policy.19 Unlike comity, the act of state doctrine is a rule of federal com-
mon law20 which theoretically should enjoy uniform application. Ironically, it is
the doctrine's introduction into federal law that has contributed to the fluidity
of its contours.
Initially, courts viewed the act of state doctrine as a manifestation of
either comity or international law." After Erie, the doctrine's theoretical
source assumed fundamental importance. If the doctrine sprang from comity,
the federal bench would lose control over the development of a uniform rule.22
While international law might have provided a logical segue into federal juris-
prudence,23 the act of state doctrine never achieved acceptance as customary
international law.24 Determined to find a predicate for federal authority, the
Supreme Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino ultimately settled on
the imprecise concept of nonmandatory "constitutional underpinnings."25
According to the Court, the Constitution vests the Executive with primary
authority for the conduct of foreign affairs.26 As a result, the Executive enjoys a
heightened institutional competence in the development of legal standards for
unsettled matters of international importance, such as the level of compensa-
tion due upon expropriation. 27 In such affairs, the Judiciary must not hinder or
19. S e Aled Banih 757 F.2d at 521 (quotIng Dabackrans, 392 lid at 715) (s ands for the proposition tha It would be an
affrontund a largely pointless exercise-for United States courts to attempt to nullify a foreign sovereign's completed domestic con'
duct); Banda, 826 F. Supp. at 705 (making a similar argument); Knight, spr note 5, at 62 (noting the act of state doctrine applies
when Judicial reexamlnation of foreign acts would (1) offend the foreign sovereign, (2) frustrate the Executve's management of for
elgn affairs, and (3) provide no effective basis for relie); McCormick tmp note 7, at 497-98 (quoting Yabacaesra, 392 F.2d at 715)(arguing the act of state doctrine rests on the realization that judicial meddling in a foreign sovereign's completed domestic conduct
would offend the foreign sovereign and have little practical effect); ZAltzeff & Kunz, wpm note 14, at 452 (same) Seea /sl F. & 1R.
Farman-lamnalan Consulting Engrs v. Harm Eng Co, 882 F.2d 281, 287 (7th Or. 1989) (describing the act of state doctrine In terms
of the foreign state's overwhelming interest in Its domestic conduct and the United States' correspondingly lower Interest), cot
denied, 497 US. 1038 (1990); Tdhcosh Co. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 766 F.2d 1333, 1338 (9th Cir. 1985) (same); Bnska, 762 .2d at
225; Eckert Intl Inc. v. Government of Sovereign Democratic Republic of Fi1, 834 . Supp. 167, 172 (.D. Va. 1993) (quoting Galsdar,
610 F. Supp. at 117-18) (noting that foreign soverelgns have a reasonable expectation of unquestioned dominion over conduct that can
be completed within their borders), qafd, 32 F.3d 77 (4th Cir 1994)
20. 376 U.& 398, 424-28 (1964); Gruson, supta note 18, at 530-31; Zaltzeff a gun, supI" note 14, at 450.
21. Kpatrick, 493 U.S. at 404 (quoting OWn, 246 U.S at 303-04). See ao Oen, 246 U.& at 303.04 (explaining that
the act of state doctrine rests on "the highest considerations of international expedlency); Unde,*it, 65 F. at 580 (quoting a New
York case for the proposition that te act of state doctrine embodies "established rules of International law'), affd, 168 U.S. 250(1897
22. S" supee note 15 and accompanyng text (establishtng that comity Is a matterof slate law); Sabbatino, 376 U.S at 425(announcing the act of state doctrine Is federal law and expressing fear at the prospect of consigning its development to 'divergent
and... parohi" stae interpretations).
23. See, e.&, Forti v. SuarezMason, 672 F. Supp 1531,1544 (NJ). Cal 1987) (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 US. 677, 700(1900); The Nerelde, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815); 138 C. WtLosH ErAL, FEmAL PVAcnca An PaWoasE 53563, at 60.63 (2d
ed. 1984) (for the propositions that: (1) customary International law Is federal common law, and (2) claims based on customary nter%
national law arise under the laws of the United States for purposes of federal question Jurisdiction.
24. Sabbaeino, 376 u.S. at 421-22.
25. Id at 423 (noting the Constitution does not require the act of state doctrine, but Justifying It on the basis of constiw
tonal underpinnings that arise out of the relationship created by the Judlcary's and the Executive's respective functions) See also
Henkin, supra note 1, at 814-17 (criticizing the Supreme Court for not laying a better foundation for a body of Judge-made federal law
that is neither required by the Constitution nor inpied by statute).
26. Sabbaftno, 376 US. at 423 (descrlbing the Executive and Legislative Departmenfs predominant, but not exclusive, role
in matters touching upon foreign affairs)
27. Id at 427.28 (examining the conflicting international norms regarding state responsibility for expropriations and dis-
cussing the Executive's institutional advattages in shaing the debate).
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embarrass the Executive.28 Nor must the bench endanger the separation of
powers by abdicating its independent role.29 With this in mind, the Court
attempted the logically difficult task of drawing the act of state into federal law
under the guise of deference to executive authority while avoiding destruction
of the Judiciary's independent status.30 Wrapping these conflicting principles
into a compact statement, the Court held that, in the absence of a treaty or set-
tled rules of international law, courts would not examine the validity of an
existing and recognized government's expropriation completed in its own terri-
tory, even if the complainant and the Executive both alleged a breach of inter-
national law.31
The Sabbatino Court's narrow holding deviates little from prior formula-
tions of the act of state doctrine. 32 If a foreign sovereign has completed an offi-
cial act within its own territory and the act does not violate accepted principles
of international law, a United States court adjudicating the resulting dispute
has no legal basis-other than public policy-upon which to set aside the foreign
W ateign's domestic conduct.33 In this situation, foreign. interests and powers
eclipse our own, and the prosecution of a conflict would serve little useful pur-
pose.34 However, the transfer of this narrow rule to federal authority by means
of an ill-defined and logically inconsistent vehicle has produced an expansive
and chaotic body of law,35 which-at its broadest-has been interpreted to
require that courts make independent decisions regarding a suit's potential to
cause the Executive embarrassment in its conduct of foreign affairs. 36
Attempting to impose definite boundaries on the doctrine, various
Supreme Court justices have proposed several exceptions to the act of state
28. Id at 432-33 (explaining the need to avoid judial emaasment of the Emutlve n Its efforts to establsh a rule of
customary International law).
29. ld at 423, 436 (noting dhe Judiciary's Independent competence for disputes Involving foreign relations and doubting
the viability of the 'Bornstein exceptlon, under which the bench's application of the act of state doctrine depends on the position
taken by the Executive). See afro First Nall City Bank v. Banco Naconal de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 767-68 (1972) (providing only three
votes In favor of the extremely deferential Bernstein practice).
30. See Henkin, supra note I, at 822 (describing the Sabbefino Courts struggle to emnclate a principle of deference that
would not also destroy judicial Independence). See also Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 461-62 (White, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of
abandoning judicial independence); Bazyler, "opes note 2, at 375 (arguing the Executives influence over act of state cases violates the
separation of powers).
31. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428-29 & n.29 (acknowledging the Executive's dear policy regarding exproprlations, but finding
no dear rule of customary International law on the subject, and defining the act of state doctrine's scope under the circumstances)
32. See id at 416-27 (tracing the act of state doctrine's lineage and affirming Its continued vitality, but updating its theoret-
tcal basis to reflect Erie concerns); Leacock, supra note 7, at 4 (noting the Sabbatino Court's approval of prior act of state formula
tions and the Courts adaptation of the doctrine to fit the modern world).
33. So, e.g., Sabbafino, 376 U.S at 438 (explaining that normal conflict-of-laws rules require the application of foreign law
to a foreign sovereign's wholly domestic conduct and noting the act of stae doctrine prevents the use of the forum's public policy to
escape this general rule)
34. See supra note 19 and accompanying texL
35. See Knight moms note 5, at 52 (describing the lower courts' complete confusion over the amorphous and conflicting
principles underlying the federalized act of state doctrine); se also Bazyler, wopms note 2, at 330, 336 (discussing the Sabbafino
Court's wide-ranging and confusing Justification for the doctrine, and describing the inability of lower courts to formulate a coherent
statement of the doctrine)
36. COmpare Kidepatrich, 493 U.S at 403, 409 (noting the district court applied the act of state doctrine on the bass of its
perception that a civil RICO action between two U.S companies might either (1) cause embarrassment to the Nigedan Government or
(2) Interfere with the United States' foreign relations, but rejecting this as a sufficient predicate for the doctrines Invocation) wth
DrOxel 610 F. Supp. at 117 (describing the act of state doctrine as a bread, case-by-case inquiry Into the potential effect of udical pro-
ceedings on the Executive's conduct of foreign afftirs), aj/d in relevant part 777 F.2d 877 (2d Cir, 1985) and Bazyler, spra note 2,
at 346 (describing the Second Circuit's use of the doctrine in Hunt v. Mobile Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977)1 carL denied, 434
U.& 984 (1977) to block examination of a foreign sovereign's motivation rather than the legality of Its actions) and Zaltzeff & Kuns,
ropra note 14, at 466 (explaining how the Hunt court found the act of state doctrine barred an examination of the motivation behind
the nationalization and rendered the daim nonjusticlable) and Zimmerman, sp note 5, at 588 (outlining the act of state doctrine
In federal courts).
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doctrine.37 Of these, the most controversial has been the Dunhill plurality's
suggested exception for purely commercial activities,-" which has been charac-
terized as necessary to the integrity of the United States' restrictive view of for-
eign sovereign immunity.9 However, perhaps as a result of its failed attempts
to clarify the act of state doctrine by the announcement of exceptions, the
Supreme Court unanimously adopted a new approach in WS. Kirkpatrick
Company v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., International.40 Now courts
should examine the doctrine's nature before entertaining discussion of its pos-
sible exceptions. 41 Under this approach, act-of-state concerns arise only when
the litigation turns upon the validity of a foreign sovereign's conduct within its
own territory and not when the proceedings might simply embarrass the for-
eign government.42 In making this point, the Court emphasized that the act of
state doctrine is not a vague principle of judicial abstention, but a narrow rule
of decision.43
B. Foreign Sovereign Status
Foreign sovereign immunity differs from comity and the act of state doc-
trine in that it protects the integrity of sovereign status.44 Traditional concep-
tions of foreign sovereign immunity start with the proposition that a
sovereign's natural power falls away at its borders.45 Absent some form of inter-
vention, sovereigns would enter the territorial jurisdiction of U.S. courts as pri-
vate persons.46 However, to facilitate intercourse between nations, the Supreme
Court long ago granted visiting sovereigns presumptive immunity from the
37. See Dunhtg 425 U.S. at 695-707 (mustering only four votes for a proposed commercial exception); First Natl City Bank
v. Bunco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 767-68 (1972) (providing three votes for a principle of absolute deference to the Executive's
position on the doctrine's applicability); id at 77073 (Douglas, J.) (advocating a counterclaim exception to the act of state doctrine
38. See supra note 7 and accompan text (citing nearly two decades of commentary on this unsettled Issue).
39. Soo Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 698.99 (hite, J., plurality opinion); Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. v. Committee of
Receivers for AW. Galadari, 810 F. Supp. 1375, 1391 (S.D.NY.), re oson otergrounds, 12 F.3d 317 (24 Cir. 1993), cert denied, 511
U.S. 1069(1994); Bazyler, supa note 2, at 353; Malvina talberstam, The "orn Sovereign Immunities Act and Om Act ofState Doc.
trine, in American Society of International Law Proceedings of the 83rd Annual Meeting 487, 488.89 (1989) [hereinafter Proceed-
tgsj, Zalteff et Kun, ssgrs note 14, at 465; Dolar, supra note 5, at 111; CynthiaK. Purcell Comment, The Act ofSto adoctrine: The
Needfor a Commercial Exception in Antirust Litigation, 18 SAn Dtoo L Rev. 813, 833 (1981); Zimerman, supra note 5, at 564.
40. 493 U.S 400 (1990).
41. Id at 404.10 (declining to address the parties lengthy argumenis about possible exceptions to the act of state doctrine
because a careful examination of the doctrine's scope established the case's filure to raise act of state concerns.
42. Id at 406, 40910.
43. Id at 406 (quoting Sabbatino, 376 US. at 427).
44. See supra note 12 and accompanying text
45. So The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S (7 Ciranch) at 136.-37 (noting thatl, by nature, sovereigns enjoy absolute power
within their own domain, but that practical considerations have led them to allow visiting soveeigns to carry their status Into the
forum's territorial Jurisdiction); Smiums, upra note 10, at 125 (describing The Schooner Exchange as the recognition of an *Implied
Ikense of exemption from the Jurisdiction of United States courts). See also r parl Republic of Pen, 318 U.S. 578, 587.88 (1943)
(noting t sovereign Immunity Is not a question of whether a foreign sovereign defendant has come within the territorial furlsdic.
tion of a United States court, but whether that jnrisdiction slsoaL be exercised after it has atached); Berizzi Bros. Co. v. The Pesaro,
271 U.S. 562, 575 (1926) (quoting an English case for the proposition that sovereign immunity Is a principle by which states agree not
to exercise their Jurisdiction agnst one another); Flout Maritima Browning de Cuba v. Motor Vessel Ciudad de Ia Habans, 335 P.2d
619, 623 (4th Cir. 1964) (noting that sovereign Immunty restricts the exercise of a United States court's cleary declaredjurdic.
tion); Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo, 36 P. Supp. 503, 505 (LD.N.Y.) (holding that foreign sovereign Immunity requires courts to rein.
quish jurisdiction), apd, 122 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1941); S. RE. No. 1310, 94th Cong, 2d Sess. 9 (1976) (declaring that sovereign
Immunity Is a principle by which courts relinquish Jurisdiction over a foreign state); 11L RE. No. 1487, 94th Cong, 2d Sess. 8 (1976)(same); 1976 Hearings, supra note 8, at 25 (testimony of Monroe Leigh, stating that foreign sovereign Immunity Is a principle under
which the courts of the United States refrain from exercising their Jurisdiction). Cf Dunhil 425 U.S at 705 (White, J., plurality opin-
ton) (explaining that the restrictive view of sovereign Immunity allows courts that would othest ire havejursdiction over a foreign
sovereign defendant to exercise that lurisdiction in disputes involving commercial activities).
46. The Schooner Exchang, I I U.S. (7 Cranch) at 136.37 (recognizlng the theory of sovereign Immunity flows not from
the visiting sovereigns inherent power, but from the host sovemigln's consent).
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compulsory jurisdiction of U.S. courts, leaving express or implied consent as
the only basis for the assertion of judicial authority.47
For nearly 150 years, U.S. courts adhered to the principle of absolute
immunity, shielding foreign sovereigns from compulsory jurisdiction regardless
of whether the nature of the transactions that brought them to our shores was
public or commercial. While the application of sovereign immunity theoreti-
cally remained a judicial exercise, the process usually involved a suggestion of
immunity by the State Department.49
During the first half of this century, increased governmental participation
in commercial activities prompted many nations to adopt the position that a
sovereign's descent to the level of a merchant operated as an implied waiver of
immunity.50 In 1952, the United States adopted this "restrictive" view of sover-
eign immunity when the State Department announced it would no longer file
suggestions of immunity in cases arising from foreign sovereigns' commercial
activities.5l Theoretically sound, this policy faced insurmountable operational
difficulties. Unbound by principles of stare decisis and subject to intense politi-
cal pressures, the State Department drew inconsistent lines between sovereign
and commercial activities.52 Seeking to impose uniform standards on immunity
determinations,"3 Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 (FSIA), 54 which vested courts with exclusive authority in these matters.5"
Intended to codify the prevailing international law of foreign sovereign
immunity,"6 the FSIA did not alter substantive rules of liability,7 but rendered
47. Se Ervin v. Quintanlla, 99 F.2d 935,938 (5th Cir. 1938) (noting a foreign sovereign may expressly or impliditly waive
immunity), cert denied, 306 U.S 635 (1939). See also ne Schooner Exchange, I I U.S. (7 Crunch) at 133 (summarizing the Attorney
Genesrl's argument that sovereign Immunity prevents courts from exercising the compulsory territorial Jurisdiction that would other-
wise attach to a soverg's activitles In the foran the remaining basis of Jurisdiction, consent, appeas to be unaffected).
48. See Dunhif, 425 U.& at 698 (White, J., plurlity opinion) (describing the United States' adherence to the absolute view
of soverelgn Immunity until 19521 id at 711.12 (reprinting the Tate Letter, which announced the State Department's repudiation of
the absolute view) Leacock, supra note 7, at 9 (describing the United States' original adherence to the absolute view).
49. 1976 H risn, supra note 8, at 62-63 (testimony of Michael It Cardozo, describing the historical practice of Executive
suggestions of immunity), see d at 26 (testimony of Monroe Leigh, explaining the dispositive effect of an Executive suggestion of
Immunity), 93 (testImony of Michael Mns Cohen, discussing the Executive's practice of making suggestions of InMnUity); S. REP. NO.
1310, at 10 (describing the bench's r liance on Executive policy in making immunity determinatios) il REP. No. 1487, at 8.
50. See DunhllL 425 U.S at 695.96 (White, J, plurality opinion) (quoting several cases for the proposition that, by descend.
ing to the level of a merchant, governments divest themselves of their sovereign statua), id at 711.14 (reproducing the Tate Letter,
which describes the restrictive views growing popularity and Justifies its acceptance in the United States In part based on the rise of
state trading compardes Le cock sMpr note 7, at 10 (explaining ncreased dissatisfaction with the absolute theory of Immunity as
the result of foreign governmets' incresed participation in International trade)
51. See Dunhhil, 425 U.S. at 698 (White, J., plurality opinion) (noting the Executive's adoption of the restrictive view by
means of the Tate Letter) Id. at 711.15 (reprinting the Tate Letter) S. REm. No  94-1310, at 10 (describing the State Department's adop-
tlion of the restrictive view, HR. Rm,. No. 94.1487, at &
52. See 1976Hwarings, sulpa note 8, at 58 (testimony of Peter D. Trooboff, describing the State Departments uneven appl-
cation of the rtrictive view) McConnick sp note 7, at 484-486 See also S. REP. No. 1310, at 9-10 (discussing the difficulties
Inherent in a political Institution's efforts to apply legal standards); iR. Rm. No. 1487, t 7-8.
53. See S. REP. No. 1310, at 9 11 (discussing the twin Sub of addressing Immunity within a consistent Judicial process and
creating a single federal standard for Immunity decislonsliRE Rap. No. 1487, at 7, 12. Q. 28 U.S.C 1602 (year) (declaring that
exclusive Judicial competence for Immunity decisions would serve the interests of Justice and protect ltigants' rights).
54. Pub. L No. 94-583, 90 St. 2891 (codified, as amended, at 28 U.SC. S 1330, 1332, 1391(0, 1114(d), 1602-1611)(1994)).
55. Si. RE. No. 1310, at 9 (fisting this as a 'principal purpose of the FSIA); ItL RP. No. 1487, at 7; 1976 Hearings,
sapra note 8, at 25-26 (testimony of Monroe Leigh, describing the Act's effect as creating exclusive Judicial competence for imm ity
decisions>, McCormick sopra note 7, at 487 (portayIng the FSIA as a repudiation of Executive Involvement in immunity determlna.
tioni)
56. Sm 28 U.S.C. 1 1602 (year) (apparently treating the FSIA as a congressional interpretation of the international law of
sovereign Immunity); S. Rep. No. -1310, at 29, HR RuP. No. 1487, at 7.
57. Sao 28 U.S.C S 1606 (1 994) (providing as a general rule, that states not enJoying immunity are liable in the same num.
nwr and to the same extent as private pessonsl S Rup. No. 94-1310, at I I(purportiug not to affect substantive rules of liability HIR
RE'. No. 94-1487, £12.
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foreign sovereign entities immune from suit unless they consented to jurisdic-
tion or an action was based on their nongovernmental conduct which had sig-
nificant jurisdictional contacts with the United States.58 For instance, a foreign
sovereign is not immune from suits based on: (1) the commercial activity of the
foreign sovereign carried on in the United States; (2) an act performed in the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign sovereign
elsewhere; or (3) an act outside the United States in connection with a commer-
cial activity of the foreign sovereign elsewhere, which causes a direct effect in
the United States.59 Unfortunately, this concise regime collapsed the distinct
issues of personal jurisdiction and immunity into a single inquiry,60 which has
provoked criticism by the jurists called upon to recognize and separate the dis-
tinct strands.61
The act of state doctrine and foreign sovereign immunity are, thus, differ-
ent creatures which serve distinct purposes. The former is a rule of federal
common law that accords respect to foreign sovereigns' purely domestic con-
duct by treating it as a rule of decision;62 the latter is a statutory reflection of
customary international law that protects sovereign status by regulating the
power of United States courts to assert their authority against foreign sover-
eigns who cross into their territorial jurisdiction.63 However, the two doctrines
share a subtle, but highly important, characteristic: both are limited by princi-
ples of territoriality.
III. CONGRUENCE VS. INDIVIDUALITY
Set in their respective historical contexts, the act of state doctrine and for-
eign sovereign immunity present relatively simple concepts. However, the con-
58. See, e.g. 28 U.SC. S 1604 (1994) (providing for Immunity unless an exception applies). Seo also id. S 1605(aXI)(waiver exception), (2) (commercial activities having a nexus with the United States) (3) (suits based on talings of property In viola.
tion of International law under circumstances n which property is present In the United States Inconnection with a commercial activ-
ity carried on In the United Sates by the foreign state), (4) (real estate and probate actions dealing with property situated In the
United States), (5) (certain noncotmercial torts occurring in the United States as the result of official-but nondiscretionary--dules,
(6) (reference to arbitration or confirmation of arbitral awards having certain contacts with the United States); id $1607 (involving
counterclaims brought against foreign sovereigns In United States courts).
59. 28 U.S.C. S 1605(aX2)
60. 1976 earings, rrpm note 8, at 28 (testimony of Monroe Legh, noting the 'subtle point" that, under the FSIA, the con-
tacts necessary for personal jurisdiction are Incorporated Into the exceptions to Immunity, 31 (testimony of Bruno A. Ritsm, describ-
Ing this as the bill's longparm feature). See also Saudi Arabla v. Nelson, 507 US. 349, 377-78 n.2 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(noting that the United States nexus of the commercial activities exception embodies a test for personal jurisdiction, and citing author-
Ity for this point); Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 306-07 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting that the
exceptions to sovereign Immunity contain the predicates not only for determinations of Immunity and subject matter jurisdiction, but
also of personal jurisdiction), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982); Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 1056, 1061-62
(E.D.N.Y. 1979) (explaining how the commercial activity exception encapsulates a threefold test for immunity, personal jurisdiction
and subject matter jurisdiction).
61. See Teas Thtding, 647 F.2d at 306-07 (calling the MA a marvel of compression' of concepts requiring distinct analy.
sis, which has Induced confusion within the district courts) Harris, 481 F. Supp. at 1061-63 (describing the FSIIAs compression of dis
similar principles, the effect of which is to conceal their distinctions); Public Acts of State, tA oreign Sovereign Immunities Ac4
and the Judiciary, in Proceeding, sup note 39, at 486 (remarks by Joseph W. Delapenna, describing the confusion arising out of
the FSIA's merger of distinct concepts). See also United World Trade, Inc. v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Prod. Ass'n, 33 F.3d 1232, 1237 (10th
Cir. 1994) (describing the direct effects clause as "hopelessly ambiguour and struggling to Identify objective standards for Its applica-
tion), Ceri denied, 513 U.S. 1112 (1995); Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1107, 1113 (quoting Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaelachta, 549 F. Supp.
1094, 1105,1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), for the proposition that the FSIA isa remakably obtuse... statutory labyrinth" and describing the
FSIA as a 'tanged web of statutory amrblguitles*); Chisholm & Co. v. Bank of Jamaica, 643 F. Supp. 1393, 1398 nn.2-3 (S.D. Fla 1986)
(noting the FSIAs merger of subject matter and personal jurisdiction, and quoting a Fifth Circuit opinion for the proposition that the
FSIA presents a "peculiarly twisted exercise In statutory draftsauship*
62. See supn notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
63. See supr notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
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fusion surrounding their modern formulations has led to the perception that
the two may not be compatible."
Speaking for a plurality of the United States Supreme Court in Alfred
Dunhill of London, Incorporated v. Republic of Cuba,6' Justice White argued
that if a foreign government's conduct brought it within the commercial activ-
Ity exception to sovereign immunity, it should not successfully avoid liability
on the basis of the act of state doctrine.66 To harmonize the act of state doc-
trine with sovereign immunity, Justice White proposed the recognition of a
commercial exception to the act of state doctrine.67 Shortly thereafter, Congress
passed the FSIA. 68 The House and Senate manifested ambivalence with respect
to the act of state doctrine. Their reports simultaneously declared that the act
of state doctrine should not apply to a foreign sovereign's non-immune com-
mercial activities, but also recognized that the FSIA had no effect on the act of
state doctrine or other substantive rules of liability.69
In the absence of clear guidance from the Supreme Court and Congress, a
split of authority has developed within the lower federal courts.70 Although
several district courts have expressed a willingness to accept a commercial
activity exception to the act of state doctrine, 71 the circuit courts of appeal have
approached the matter with greater reserve, rarely embracing the exception,72
more regularly expressing doubts about its viability,73 and generally declining
to resolve the matter.74 The persistence of controversy in this area springs from
the odd mixture of strength and weakness inherent in the positions advocated
by both sides of the debate.
64. Sea spra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing the perceived need to defend the restrictive view's integity by
establlshlng commercial exception to the act of state doctrine)
65. 425 U.S 682 (1976) (plurdity portion of Justice White's opinion)
66. see at 69s-9.
67. See at 7o6.
68. Compar the SIA asu note 54 (pssed on October 1, 1976) wM Du /i, 425 U.S. at 682 (decided on May 24,
1976).
69. S. RE'. No. 1310, at I1, 19 (purporting not to affect substantive rules of liablty, including the act of state dotrine);
HIL Rep. No. 1487, at 12, 20 (same).
70. Sea supra note 7 and accompanyinl tet
71. Sa, ag., Bcker 834 F. Supp. ast 171 (apparendy accepting the wisdom of justice Widte's plurality opinion in Dnh)
affd, 32 F.3d 77 (4th Cir 1994);;, Drem 810 F. Supp. as 1391, m on otsewgrounds, 12 F3d 317 (2d Ci. 1993), cat denied, 114
S. Ct 1644 (19941); Sap j.'l Ltd. v. Cadillac Oe Co, 534 F. Supp. 896, 905, 907 (RD. Mich. 1981) (saw); American I 1t l Group, lc.
v. Islumic Republic of Iran, 493 F. Supp. 522, 525 (D.C.D.C. 1980) (samne), ,'anded on oblergrounds, 657 F.Zd 430 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Dominicus Americana Bohlo v. Gulf & Western lond., tnc., 473 . Supp. 680, 689-90 (SD.N.Y 1979) (same); see also AMPAC Group,
Inc. v. Republic of Honduras, 797 F. Supp. 973, 978 (SD. Fla. 1992) (holding the act of state doctrine either does not apply or is at Its
weakest when a claim Involves a government's commercial activities affd, 40 F.3d 389 (QI th Cir. 1994).
72. See Compsla de Go de Nuevo aredo, S. v. Entex, Ina, 686 F.2d 322 326-27 (5th CIe 1982) (appearing to recognize
the validity of a commercial acitity exception to the act of state doctrine but finding It Inapplicable to that cts at bar), cort denied,
460 U.S 1041 (1983).
73. Sea, e.g., Kalanazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov't of Socialist EthIopa, 729 F.2d 422, 425 n.3 (6th
Or. 1984) (doubting the precedential value of the Dun/flD plurality's comaercial activity exception to the act of state doctuine) Intet,
national Ass'n of Machinists v. Osgnliation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 649 F.2d 1354, 1360 (9th Cir. 1981) (explaining that
the act of state doctrine Is 'not diluted' by the PSIA's commercial activity exception and holding that a foreign state's seemngly coo.
mercial activities may triger the act of state doctrine), cat den ed, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982)
74. Soa, ag. alJo, 764 F.2d at 1114.-15 (describing the position taken by the Dunhill pluality, but declining to rule on
the status of itsposed exception ftha, 762 F.2d at 225 (explaning that the Second Crcult has not adopted a commercial excep-
tion to the act of state doctrine and leaving the resolution of this issue for another day); Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petro-
eum Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 408 (91 Cir. 1983) (noing that only four justices supported a commercial exception to the act of state
doctrine in Dunhif and declining to resolve the Issue), cat danied, 464 US. 1040 (1984); Empresa Cubana Exportadora v. Lambern
& Co., 652 F.2d 231, 238-39 (2d ar. 1981) (noting a clear dffeentlatlon between the act of state doctine and foreign sovereign
immunity, but understanding the two principal Dnl opinions to suggest that courts should be issind not to apply the act of state
doctrine to a governments commetci activity) see also Leacock, sr p note 7, at 2 (describing the tendency of lower federal courts
to avoid definitive rulhn on the existence of a commercial exception to the act of state doctrine).
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Those favoring a commercial activity exception to the act of state doctrine
rely on the premise that, in adopting to the restrictive view of foreign sover-
eign immunity, the political branches of the United States approved the subjec-
tion of foreign sovereigns to suit for their commercial activities.7 Under these
circumstances, the bench should not undermine this policy by applying the act
of state doctrine.76 Thus, the judiciary must establish congruity by recognizing
a commercial activity exception to the act of state doctrine.77
Easily stated and facially reasonable, this position suffers from a series of
weaknesses. First, courts strictly construe statutes that derogate from the com-
mon law.78 Thus, because the FSIA does not expressly displace the act of state
doctrine's intentional frustration of public policy,79 courts should not imply
such an effect. 8o Second, in explaining the FSIA, Congress expressed its desire
not to affect the act of state doctrine.81 Third, the act of state doctrine is a rule
of decision, which differs from the jurisdictional principles embodied in the
FSIA.82 Therefore, even if a court has jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign, the
court still must decide which substantive law to apply, which is a matter the
FSIA leaves unregulated.83 And fourth, the Supreme Court traditionally has dis-
favored the wholesale importation of sovereign immunity exceptions into the
act of state doctrine.84
Against this litany of arguments, defenders of the proposed commercial
exception have mounted a formidable attack. First, notwithstanding the differ-
ences between jurisdiction and choice-of-law, Congress chose not to address the
act of state doctrine in the FSIA because it believed the former would not apply
75. Se, a8, Dunhig 425 U.S. at 698 (noUng the xecuttv's adoption of the restrictive view of sovereign immunity).
76. Il Se also S. Rp. No. 94-1310, at 19 n. (adopting the Executive's opiton that courts should not use the act of state
doctrine to allow foreign sovereign Imaunity to reenter through the *back door); IL. Re. No. 94-1487, at 20, 0. (same); Bazyler,
supw note 2, at 353 (arguing against a formulation of the act of state doctrine that would frustuate the commercial activity exception
to foreign sovereign Immunity); Leaock, supra note 7, at 34 (sam); Zatff & Kun sapa note 14, at 465 (same); Dolar, sapra note
5, at 92 (me); Purcell, surm note 39, at 833 (smne). Q1 Halberstant, aps note 39, at 488-89 (acknowledging the act of state doc-
trine and foreign sovereign Immunity have distinctive features, but finding It Inappropriate for courts to use the former to undermine
the political branches decisions regarding the latter).
77. See d (all suggesting that harmony between the two doctrines depends on the recognition of a coextensive commercial
exception).
78. Sm, e.g., Achebe, spra note 4, at 297 n.225 (arguing that, absent a contrary Intent, the FSIA should be deemed to corn-
plmnent, and not to displace, the common law act of state doctrine).
79. Se supra notes 18.19 and accompanying text (explaining that the act of state doctrine Is intended to frustrate applca-
tion of the forum's public policy)l
80. S" Achebe, supra note 4, at 297 n.225 (arguing the proper approach Is to presume the legislature acted in a spirit of
accord with Its coequal branch and did not, abent language to the contrary, intend to displace ludge-made law).
81. .RE. No. 94.1310, at 11, 19 (purporting not to affect substantve rules of liability, Including the act of state doctrin);
H. R,. No. 94-1487, at 12, 20 (1976) (same). Soe also 1976iHearings, spra note 8, at 33-34 (testimony of Monroe Leigh, stating the
FSIA would not affect the act of state doctrine).
82. See, .&, Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 726-28 (1976) (Marsfl, J., dissenting) (making this distinction, and arguing these looi'
cal differences prevent the wholesale importation of Immunity exceptions Into the act of state doctrine); Achebe, stpra note 4, at 251,
294-95 (arguing for the need to uphold the logicai differences between the two doctrines, which would allow courts to block litigation
when political sensitivtes warrant such a result); McConrnck sxprs note 7, at 479,494, 512; Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 564, 568.
See also Harnon, supr note 7, at 772-73 (explaining the Important distinctions between the act of state doctrine and foreign sover-
elgn immunity).
83. See supe notes 57, 81 and accompanying text (explaining that the FSIA makes no changes to substantive rules of liabil-
Ity, Including the act of state doctrine). Compare Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg, Co., 313 U.S. 487, 495.96 (1941) (establishing that
choke-o-law rules are substantive) &nU supra notes 17-18, 82 and accompanying text (explaining that the act of state doctrine is a
choice-of-law rule).
84. Se Sabbano, 376 U.S. at 438 (refusing to import the foreign sovereign Immunity counterclaim exception into the act
of state doctrine because th  two are logically distinct theories that serve different purposes). See also First Nail City Bank, 406 U.S
at 771 (Dousglas, J., concurring) (quoting National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 US. 356, 365 (1955)) (providing the ordy vote
In favor of applying the foreign sovereign immunity counterclaim exception to the act of state doctrine); Empres Cubana Exporta-
dora, 652 F.2d at 238 (citing Sabbalino as authority for the refusal to Import the FSI~s counterclaim exception into the act of Mate
doctrine).
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to cases falling within the latter's commercial activities exception.8 5 And sec-
ond, the bench should not frustrate the legislature's will,86 especially when the
result is to make cases turn upon judges' individual perceptions of the effect of
litigation on foreign affairs.8 7
The inability of either side to prevail in this debate suggests the answer
lies in some overlooked middle ground. Perhaps the substitution of compatibil-
ity for absolute congruence would satisfy both the desire to establish harmony
between the two doctrines and the effort to maintain their theoretical distinc-
tions.
IV. Do OPPOSITES ATTRACT?
Compatibility arises not from exact duplication, but from interaction
between diverse objects. With regard to the act of state doctrine and the FSIA's
commercial activity exception, we suggest their distinct territorial limitations
provide a natural basis for compatibility.
The act of state doctrine embodies a practical understanding of the wis-
dom of avoiding a direct conflict with a foreign sovereign's legitimate expecta-
tions under circumstances in which U.S. interests and power are minimal."8 In
evaluating the doctrine's applicability to a given set of facts, the first step is to
determine whether the litigation turns on the validity of foreign sovereign acts
that have come to complete fruition within the foreign sovereign's own terri-
tory.89 If the judicial proceedings would require scrutiny of such behavior, the
court must dispose of the matter consistent with the act of state doctrine.90
However, if the foreign sovereign's conduct spills over its borders prior to com-
pletion, only comity applies.91 Thus, if the foreign sovereign attempts to expro-
priate a person's property worldwide, the act of state doctrine applies only to
property located within the sovereign's territory and not to objects outside its
85. See S. REP. No. 94-1310, at 19 n.I(anticipating that the act of state doctrine would not apply to actions falling within the
FSIA's commeicial activity exception); R. REPt. No. 94-1487, at 20 n1; see also Zaltzeff& Kun, supra note 14, at 468-69 (quoting the
House Report on this point)
86. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. See also note 76 and accompanying text.
87. Henkin, supra note 1, at 826 (doubting the bench's competence to determine the needs of U.S. foreign policy); Knight,
supra note 5, at 60.61 (stating that courts ae llequipped to predict the effect of litigation on foreign policy);
88. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. See also note 34 and accompanying text.
89. See Braka, 762 F.2d at 224 (applying the 'complete fruition" territorial standard as the first step in an act of state doc-
trine analysis); Zaltzeff & Kunz, supra note 14, at 451-52 (quoting Tabacalera, 392 F.2d at 715, curt. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968))
(announcing the "complete fruition standard' and stating that the Second Circuit applies the territoriality limitation as the first step in
an act of state case). See also Kiripatrick, 493 U.S. at 400 (noting the act of state doctrine does not apply unless a court must directly
pass Judgment on the validity of a foreign sovereign's domestic acts).
90. See Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 400
91. See, e.g., Aflied Bank, 757 F.2d at 522 (finding the titus of Costa Rica's debt to be in the United Slates and, therefore,
applying a comity analysis instead of the act of state doctrine), ceurt. denied, 473 U.S. 934 (1985); United Bank, Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l,
Inc., 542 F.2d 868, 872-77 (2d Cir 1976) (applying a comity analysis to a foreign sovereign's decreed seizure of overseas assets
because the act of state doctrine does not apply to conduct not completed in the foreign soveregn's territory); Republic ofIraq, 353
F.2d at 50-51, cert denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966); Boland, 614 F Supp. at 1173-74 (refusing to apply the act of state doctrine to a for-
eign sovereign's decision to terminate and libel an employee in the United States, and noting that only comity applies to decisions
which cannot be completed within the foreign sovereign's domain); Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. v. Galadari, 610 F. Supp.
I 14, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (declining to recognize a foreign decree as an act of state because the act of state doctrine looks to the situs
of completed conduct rather than the situs of an official decision, which is entiled only to comity), affd in relevanlpart, 777 F.2d
877 (2d Cir. 1985).
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dominion.92 Similarly, the act of state doctrine does not apply to a sovereign's
decision to repudiate an obligation calling for performance abroad93 or a for-
eign sovereign's internal decision to terminate an employee in the United
States.94 And the domestic initiation of tortious activity is not an act of state if
the foreign sovereign takes steps within the United States to ensure its comple-
tion.95 Under each of these circumstances, the foreign sovereign's conduct has
not reached fruition at home and, therefore, merits comity-but not recognition
as an act of state.96 In sum, the act of state doctrine carries an inherent territo-
rial limitation;97 it protects sovereign activity that does not cross the sover-
eign's borders before achieving completion.
Like the act of state doctrine, the traditional conception of sovereign
immunity rests on territorial principles: it remedies the natural loss of power
experienced by sovereigns outside their domain.9 Foreign sovereign immunity
compensates for this phenomenon by shielding foreign sovereigns from the
compulsory jurisdiction that would otherwise attach upon their entry into the
territorial jurisdiction of United States courts.99 However, foreign sovereign
immunity has never closed the door to jurisdiction by consent, which may be
express or implied.I0 One manifestation of implied consent, ultimately
accepted by the United States, is participation in commercial activities having a
significant jurisdictional nexus with the forum.1 1 Thus, under the common law
of foreign sovereign immunity, courts held that jurisdiction may lie against a
92. See, e.g., Cosmic Int', 542 F.2d at 872-73 (refusing to accord act of state status to a foreign decree's attempted selsare
of assets located within in the United States and applying a comity analysts Instead); Republic of raq, 353 F.2d at 50-51.
93. S*, e.g., Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 521 (refusing to treat a debt repudiation as an act of state, because the debt's repay-
ment silas was n the United States, and applying a comity analysis Instead); Eckert, 834 F. Supp. at 172 (declining to consider the
breach of a consulting agreement as an act of state because the contract anticipated performance In the United States); Galadari, 610
F. Supp. at 118-19 (refusing to treat the 'freezing' of a private person's debt payments as an act of state because the obligations antic-
lpated performance outside of Dubai, and applying a comity analysis Instead).
94. See, e.g., Boland, 614F. Supp. at 1173-74 (refusing to treat the termination of an employee in the United States as an
act of state, because It was not completed in Irar and noting that a comity analysis applies to cases Involving the extraterrtorlal
effect of decrees which are aimed at rights whose situs lies outside the foreign sovereigns domain). See also Eckert, 834 F. Supp. at
172 (Involving a contract for lobbying services to be performed In the United States).
95. See, e.g., Boland, 614 F. Supp. at 1173-74 (declIning to apply the act of state doctrine to a libel action, because publica-
tion occured In the United States, and noting that a comity analysts applies to cases involving the extraterritorial effect of foreign
sovereign activity which is not completed domestically).
96. See supra notes 13, 16, 92-95 and accompanying text (establishing that only comity attaches to foreign sovereign con-
duct which does not come to complete fruition within the sovereign's domain).
97. See, eg., Tchacosh, 766 F.Md at 1336 (recognizing that principles of territoriality run deep through the act of state doc-
trine).
98. Soe.supo notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
99. Exparte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 587-88 (1943) (noting that sovereign Immunity is not a question of whether a
foreign sovereign defendant has come within the territorial Jurisdiction of a United States court, but whether that Jurisdiction should
be exercised after It has attached); Berizzi Bros, 271 US. at 575 (quoting an English case for the proposition that sovereign Immunity
Is a principle by which states agree not to exercise their Jurtsdiction against one another) Flora Marilima Browning de Cuba, 335
F.2d at 623 (4th Cl. 1964) (noting that sovereign Immunity restricts the exercise of a United Stases court's clearly declared Jurisdic-
tion); Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo, 36 F. Supp. 503, 505 (ED.N.Y 1941) (holding the recognition of foreign sovereign Immunity
requires courts to relinquish Jurisdiction), aed, 122 F.2d 355 (2d CI. 1941); S. Rt. No. 1310, at 9 (declaring that sovereign Immunity
Is a principle by which courts relinquish Jurisdiction over a foreign state); HK REP. No. 1487, at 8.
100. See Exparte Republic ofPeru, 318 U.S. at 587-89 (deciding whether a foreign sovereign waived Its Immunity); Ervin v.
Quintila, 99 F.2d 935, 938 (5th C. 1938) (noting a foreign sovereign may waive Immunity expressly or Implicitly), ceri: denied, 306
U.S. 635 (1939); S. RE,. No. 1310, at 18 (noting that courts had found Implicit waivers of Immunity); IL ltR.I. No. 1487, at 18 (sme)t
See also The Schooser Exchange, II US. (7 Cranch) at 123, 133 (summarizing the United States Attorney's position that sovereign
Immunity could be waived by Implication and summarizing the Attorney General's argument that sovereign Immunity destroys a
court's compulsory Jurisdiction).
101. See supra note 50 and accompanying text; ee also The Schooner Eachange, I1 US. (7 Cranch) at 145 (apparently surf
gesting that a foreign sovereign's purchase of land within the forum for private purposes might operate as an Implied waiver); Siena
Rederi AB v. Comision de Contratos, 923 F.2d 380, 391 (5th Cir 1991) (discussing the applicability of the FSIA's commercial activity
exception In terms of whether the foreign sovereign 'acted In any way inconsistent with the grant of sovereign Immunity).
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foreign sovereign for suits arising from its commercial activities. 102 This means
not that the presence of a commercial activity is sufficient to invoke the juris-
diction of United States courts, but that sovereign immunity will not inhibit the
proper assertion of territorial jurisdiction in suits based on commercial acts. 1 3
Unfortunately, courts and commentators occasionally misinterpret this
principle and suggest that jurisdiction will lie for actions involving a foreign
sovereign's commercial activities.1d That was not true at common law'05 and it
remains untrue under the FSIA.i °d While the Act's compression of immunity
and jurisdictional concepts has led to some confusion,107 it most definitely
retains a strong territorial component.0 8 Thus, jurisdiction will not lie in
respect of a foreign sovereign's commercial activity unless the suit is based on
an act which occurred, or caused a direct effect, in the United States. 10 9 Thus,
there is a tentative basis for compatibility between the act of state doctrine
and the commercial activity exception to the FSIA: if the suit is based upon an
event that occurred within the United States, the act of state doctrine cannot
apply because the relevant conduct has not come to fruition within the foreign
sovereign's domain."0 At first blush, the direct effects prong raises a question
102. See Dunhi 1, 425 U.S. at 682, 705 (1976) (plurality opinion of White, J.) (noting the restrictive view of foreign sovereign
immunity permits courts otherwise seized ofjursdiction to adjudicate the commercial obligations of foreign governments). Cf 28
U.S.C. S1602 (describing the restrictive view as a concept under which foreign sovereigns cannot claim Immunity from the normal
jurisdiction of courts when litigation involves their commercial activities).
103. S. 28 U.S.C. S1602.
104. See, e.g., Antares Aircraft, LP v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 999 F.2d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 1993) (Altmark J, dissenting
(arguing that the direct effects clase applies whenever a foreign sovereign harms a United Slates partnership, which would essentially
extend jurisdiction to all commercial disputes between foreign sovereigns and United States business partnerships), cert denied, 510
U.S. 1071 (1994); Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugtne Kuhlman, 853 F.2d 445, 448, 452-53 (6th Cir. 1988) (describing the facts of a case in
which aformer employee of the US. corporate plaintiff contacted a French governmental company regarding the plaintiffs trade
secrets, the former employee and the defendant met in France to discuss the matter and the defendant ultimately secured the plain.
tiff's propriety nformationfroam aJapanese company, and holding the plaintiffs experience of a financial loss supported jurisdiction
under the direct effects clause); Magnus Eleca, Inc. v. La Republica Argentina, 830 F.2d 1396, 1404-05 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing CaOejo
and noting the existence of authority for the preposition that a US. corporation's economic loss can trigger jurisdiction under the
direct effects clause); CallsJo, 764 F.2d at 1111-12 (construlng the direct effects clause to apply because a natural person reslding in
the United States suffered financial harm); AMPAC Group, Inc., 797 F. Supp. at 977 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (finding a direct effect in the
United States based on the fact that a United States corporation suffered a financial loss), affd, 40 F.3d 389 (11th Cr. 1994); Obe-
chain Corp. v. Corporation Nacionale de Inverslones, 656 F. Supp. 435, 440 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (noting a split of authority regarding the
sufficiency of economic lost to trigger jurisdiction under the FSIA and holding that financial los to a United States corporation would
support Ju.-lsdiction under the direct effects clause, but that financial loss to Its Panamanian subsidiary would not); affd inpartand
revd inpart, 898 F.2d 142 (3d Cir 1990); Achebe, sPra note 4, at 281; Bazyler, snpra note 2, at 351; Purcell supra note 39, at 841
(stating the FSIA grants jurisdiction to hear cases involving a foreign sovereigns commercial activities). See am Leacock, opes note
7, at 14 (apparently suggesting that the FSIA grants jurisdiction over foreign sovereign commercial activities having no contacts with
the United States). C. Drexel, 12 F.3d at 329 (agreeing with the trial court that the foreign sovereign's activities may have been com-
mercial In nature, but reversing its decision not to grant immunity because the relevant conduct possessed no jurisdictional nexus with
the United States), cart denied, 114 S. Ct 1644 (1994); Eckert, 834 F. Supp. at 170-71 (applying the FSIAs commercial activity excep-
tion without any serious Inquiry into the jurisdictional nexus with the United States), affd, 32 F.3d 77 (4th Cir. 1994). But see
Antares Aircraft, 999 F.2d at 36 (rejecting the argument that a foreign sovereign's dotestic tortious behavior caused a direct effect in
the United States by virtue of the financial harm inflicted on a U.S. business partnership and recognizing that such a construction
would leave foreign sovereigns open to litigation In the United States for any commercial disputes with U.S. businesses and Individ-
al).
105. See ropes note 102 and accompanying text.
106. See, ,gJanl v. Kuwait Univ., 43 F.3d 1534, 1537 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (emphasizing that a foreign soverelgn's commercial
activity does not resolve the question of jurisdiction under the FSIA, which also depends on the presence of a nexus with the United
States); Kramer v. Boeing Co, 705 F Supp. 1392, 1395-96 (D. Minn. 1989) (dlsmissing a claim against a foreign air carrier because its
commercial activities in the United States had no connection to the suit at bar); 1976 Hearings, sopes note 8, at 31 (testimony of
Bruno A. Ritsuu, explaining that, for jurisdiction to lie under the FSIA, the dispute itsey'must have some relation to the United States);
Kahale, supra note 7, at 407 (noting that Congress intended to subject foreign sovereigns to suit for commercial activities having the
requisite jurisdictional nexus with the United States).
107. See supea notes 30,35-36, 60-61 and accompanying text.
108. See supes note 106 and accompanying text.
109. 28 US.C. S 1605(aX2);
110. See S. Rep. No. 1310, at 19 &1 (noting the act of state doctrine should not apply to cases falling within the FSIA's com-
mercial activities exception, 'whose touchstone Is a concept of'commercial activity nvolving signihcantlarisdictional contacts with
this country') (emphasis added); lit RP. No. 1487, at 20 n.I.
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about the two doctrines' full compatibility because a "direct effect in the
United States" suggests that the underlying conduct may have been completed
elsewhere."' However, a careful examination of recent cases establishes that
the FSIA's "direct effects" clause describes conduct falling outside the act of
state doctrine's scope.
To come within the direct effects clause, the foreign sovereign's commer-
cial activity must fulfill two criteria. First, the effect must be direct."2 And sec-
ond, it must be located within the United States.113 The first requirement is
easily met. To be direct, an effect must not be purely trivial, speculative, or
attenuated. 114 However, it need not be substantial, provided it flows as an
immediate consequence of the foreign sovereign's activity."5 Establishing the
United States as the location of the direct effect presents a greater challenge."I6
The contact with the United States must not be remote or fortuitous.1 7 Rather,
the determination of location depends chiefly upon the situs of the legally sig-
nificant acts, omissions, or events giving rise to the plaintiff's cause of
action. 8 Thus, a foreign sovereign's renunciation of an agreement with a U.S.
entity has no direct effect in the United States if the contract did not provide
for performance in the United States.119 The fact that a person located in the
U.S. suffered a loss is of no consequence because the direct effect is felt at the
111. See agiejo, 764 F.2d at 1111-12 (concluding that a foreign sovereign's commercial activity had a direct effect In the
United States because It had hanned a United States resident, but applying the act of state doctrine because the foreign sovereign's uni
lateral debt restructuring took place entirely within its territory) InternationalAss'n of Machinists, 649 F.2d at 1357-61 (sggesting
the alleged antitrust activities of a foreign sovereign might 611 within the FSIA's commercial activity exception, but applying the act of
state doctrine to defeat the plaintiff's suit; In Its discussion, the Ninth Circuit did not seriously explore the territorial aspects of either
doctrine), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Leacock, supra note 7, at 30 (sensing a potential conflict between the act of state doc-
trine and the FSIA because a foreign sovereign's completed domestic conduct could have a direct effect In the United States); McCor-
nick, supru note 7, at 505, 515.
112. See Weltover, Inc. v Republic of Argentina, 941 F.2d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 1991) (evaluating whether an effect was drect)
afrd, 504 U.S. 607 (1992); Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 311-12 (2d Cir. 1981) cert
denied, 454 U.S. 1148(1982).
113. See Weltover, 941 F.2d at 152 (deciding whether a direct effect was located In the United States); Texas Trading, 647
F.2d at 312.
114. See, e.g., Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618 (stating that jurisdiction cannot be based on purely trivial effects In the United
States, suggesting that certain phenomena may be too speculative to be considered effects, and finding that a purported effect was too
attenuated to be direct); McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran 52 F.3d 346, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting the effect must not be
purely trivial), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 704 (1996) AMPAC Group, Ina, 797 F. Supp. at 977 (requiring that an effect not be specula-
tive) affd, 40 F.3d 389 (11th Cir. 1994).
115. See, e.g., Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618 (rejecting a "substantiality" requirement and holding an effect is direct If It follows
as an Immediate consequence of a sovereign defendant's activity); United World Trade, Inc. v. Mangyshlakieft Oil Prod. Ass'n, 33 F.3d
1232, 1238 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding the FSIA's commercial exception inapplicable because the defendant's activity caused no Itmiedi-
ate consequences in the United States). cart denied, 513 U.S. 1079 (1995); Goodman Holdings v. Rafldain Bank, 26 F.3d 1143, 1146(D.C. Cir. 1994) (examining the record for an Immediate consequence in the United States) cert denied, 115 S. CL. 728 (1995); Ver-
meulen v. Renault, U.SA, Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1545 (1ith Cir.), cert denied, 508 U.S. 907 (1993).
116. see Weltover, 941 F.2d at 152 (calling this a Imore troublesome nquiry" ) Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 312 (stating this
is "the must difficult aspect of the direct effects clause").
117. See, eg., Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618, 112 S. CL. at 2168 (holding that a direct effect in the United States cannot be
remote); Antares Aircraft v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 999 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cr. 1993) (refusing to apply the SlIA's commercial excep-
tion because the claim Involved only a fortuitous nexus with the United States), ced denied, 510 U.S. 1071 (1994); Reed Int'l Trading
Corp. v. Donau Bank AG, 866 F. Supp. 750, 754 (SD.N.Y. 1994) (denying an immunity-based motion to dismiss because the effect in
the United States was not fortuitous); see also United World Trude, 33 F.3d at 1238 (noting the direct effects clause does not confer
jurisdiction over a dispute simply because its ripples eventually manage to reach our shores).
118. S e.g., United World Trade, 33 F.2d at 1239 (quoting Weltover, 941 F.2d at 152, for the proposition that, in fixing the
location of a direct effect, courts often look to the place of legally significant acts giving rise to the claim); Antares Aircraft, 999 F.2d
at 36 (applying the "legally significant acts" test and stating the Supreme Court used a similar approach In Weltover); General Elec.
Capital Corp. v. Grossman. 991 F.2d 1376, 1383-85 (8th Cr. 1993) (noting that courts frequently use the "legally significant acts" test
to localize direct effects); Weltover, 941 F2d at 152 (noting that courts frequently use the 'legally significant acts" test to establish the
situs of direct effects); see also Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 849 F.2d 1511, 1515, (D.C. Cr. 1988) (using the site of legally sig-
nificant "happenings" to determine the location of direct effects).
119. See, e.g., United World Trade, 33 F.3d at 1237 (finding no direct effect In the United States because no part of the con
tract was to be performed here); Goodman Holdings, 26 F.3d at 1146 (same).
723] THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE AND FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 737
anticipated place of performance. 2' Also, if a commercial tort's locus falls
entirely outside the United States, there is no direct effect in the United States,
even if a domestic entity suffers a crushing financial setback.'2' Conversely, the
repudiation of an obligation slated for performance in the United States causes
a direct effect in the United States.'22 Similarly, the tortious production of con-
sumer goods abroad causes a direct effect in the United States if the United
States is the site of physical injury.12 3 Significantly, these same contacts also pre-
vent application of the act of state doctrine.124
Thus, under the direct effects clause, there can be no jurisdiction unless
the dispute involves the occurrence of some legally significant act within the
United States. As a result, if jurisdiction lies under the direct effects clause, the
act of state doctrine cannot apply because the relevant sovereign conduct has
not achieved complete fruition within the sovereign's territorial domain.
Herein lies the key to harmonizing the act of state doctrine with FSIA's com-
mercial exception: the former poses no threat to the latter because the two are
naturally confined to distinct territorial spheres. The act of state doctrine
involves a foreign sovereign's purely domestic conduct, while the FSIA commer-
cial activities exception attaches to conduct that in some way crosses into the
territorial jurisdiction of United States courts. As a consequence, the act of state
doctrine should never apply to conduct falling within the FSIA's commercial
exception and the FSIA's commercial exception should never apply to conduct
falling within the act of state doctrine. Thus, although the Dunhill plurality
and its many scholarly defenders have wisely argued in favor of avoiding a con-
flict between the act of state doctrine and the commercial exception to foreign
sovereign immunity, their talk of absolute congruity presents an unnecessary
detour because the desired harmony flows naturally from the doctrines' dis-
tinct territorial underpinnings.
V. CONCLUSION
The modern federalization of the act of state doctrine and foreign sover-
eign immunity has transformed relatively simple concepts into doctrinal hob-
goblins. Placing the narrow act of state into a cavernous vehicle, the Sabbatino
Court invited confusion about the doctrine's scope.12 5 Compressing notions of
120. See Zedan, 849 F.2d at 1515 (holding that when all legally significant events took place overseas, a U.S. individual felt
the effects there); see also United Worid Tade, 33 F.3d at 123839 (rejecting the argument that a United States corporation can cape-
rience the effects of a financial setback only in the United States).
121. See Antares Aircrvt 999 F.2d at 36 (concluding the FSIA's commercial activity exception did not apply to a conversion
claim, because all legally significant acts took place outside the United States, and refusing to find a direct effect in the United States
based on the alleged ove"ea conversion of a U.S. partnershlp's solo asset.
122. See, eg., Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618-19 (finding a direct effect in Argentina's unilateral rescheduling of a debt oblga
tions, the payments of which were due in New York); see also 1976'Hearings, supra note 8, at 37-38 (testimony of Monroe Leigh stat-
lng that the FSIA Is consistent with the European Convention on State Immunity and setting forth the Convention's text, Including
Article 4, which renders states non-immune In suits based on their failure to perform contractual obligations that were due in the
form's territory).
123. See Vemendon, 985 F.2d at 1545 (concluding that a French automobile producer's neglgent design and manufacture of
a passenger restraint system produced a direct effect In the United States because the complaint alleged this activity caused njury In
an automobile accident within the United States), cert denied, 508 U.S. 907 (1993).
124. See suopa notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
125. See suptu notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
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immunity and territorial jurisdiction, the FSIA's drafters made it difficult to rec-
ognize their separate identities and the existing body of precedent that they
represent. 2 6 Not surprisingly, jurists and scholars initially voiced concern that
the act of state doctrine might devour the FSIA's commercial exception. 127 How-
ever, the Supreme Court's recent decision to look through the miasma 28 and
into the act of state doctrine's core makes such fears unwarranted. The disiinct
territorial underpinnings of the act of state doctrine and the FSIA's commercial
activity exception suggest a natural harmony,129 which is confirmed by recent
case interpretations.130
126. Se supra notes 60.61 and accompanying text.
127. See supat notes 38-39, 66-67 and accompanying tat.
128. See supio notes 9, 4041 and accompaying text
129. Se supra note 110 and accompanying text.
130. S" supra notes 110-24 and accompanying text.
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